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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
There is not substantial evidence supporting the finding of the Labor Commission.
In support of its argument that there is substantial evidence. Appellee quotes from the
ruling of the Labor Commission as follows:
Based on all this information it was the panel's opinion that the onset of Mr.
Brady's hypoxia and pain management difficulties occurred after the December
2001 auto accident, and thus, it was the auto accident that was the direct cause of
Mr. Brady's permanent and total disability—not the January 2001 work accident. 1
While Appellant will show that this statement regarding the hypoxia is factually incorrect,
it is also significant to note what is not in this statement, wliich is any reference to left
shoulder and low back injuries, which are a main cause of Appellant's disability. It is
apparent from the Appellee's brief, and the Labor Commission' ruling, that these entities
have not been able to fully grasp the significance of the left shoulder and low back
components of Appellant's disability. To gain a proper understanding, it is primarily
important to review the facts of the how the industrial accident in question happened,
which the Appellee has conveniently left out of its brief. It $hould be remembered that
when the 2,000 pound sign was pressing on Appellant's chest, Appellant's low back was
being pressed up against a metal railing that was around the lift box that Appellant was in.
Due to the great pressure from the sign, and due to the railing being positioned against
Appellant's low back, the Appellant was being bent over backwards at almost a 90°

1 Brief of Appellee, p. 8
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angle.2 These facts would naturally indicate that there very well could have been
significant injuries to the left shoulder and the low back, which indeed, there was.
LEFT SHOULDER
Appellee stated in its Brief "Mr. Brady suffered serious bilateral shoulder injuries
in the August 1996 motor vehicle accident.'^ While it is true that Appellant suffered
some symptoms in both shoulders, it is also true that, as shown by the subsequent
treatment history, the symptoms relating to the right shoulder were much more extensive,
and that there was no significant injury to the left shoulder until the industrial accident in
question. After the auto accident in August of 1996, Appellant first saw Dr. Sheriden, his
family doctor. What is significant about this first visit is that there is no mention of
symptoms relating to the left shoulder.4 In the next visit with Dr. Sheridan, there is a note
that there was some pain in "both shoulders," but then that is followed with a note of
"right greater than left."5 Dr. Walker was the next doctor Appellant saw regarding
injuries from the August 1996 auto accident. Dr. Walker stated that "Lex . . . was
involved in a head on motor vehicle accident... He injured his right shoulder. He states
that it felt like it came out of j o i n t . . . Lex has inflamed painful right shoulder."6 What is
significant is that there is not any mention in this note about problems with the left
shoulder, just the right shoulder.

2 R. Vol. 2 of 4, p. 58.
3 Appellee's Brief, p. 14, Tf20.
4R.Vol.3of4,atl32.
5 M a t 131.
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A review of Dr. Sheridan's records between September of 1996 and January of
2001 (the month of the industrial accident), reveals that thefe are numerous notes
regarding problems with the right shoulder, including two surgeries on the right shoulder
in 1998, but there is hardly any mention of any problems with the left shoulder.7
Conversely, after the industrial accident of January 24, 2001, Appellant definitely
complained of serious left shoulder pain,8 and between the industrial accident and the
auto accident in December of 2001, the focus was on the left shoulder.9 In fact, on April
17, 2001, Dr. Warner observed that Appellant, "now has significant complaints of left
shoulder pain. His previous problems have been localized primarily to the right side."io It
is very significant to note that Appellant worked for about seven years following the
injury to the right shoulder, but, as will be expounded upon below, almost immediately
after the serious injury to the left shoulder in the industrial accident, Appellant and his
doctors begin talking about Appellant retiring from work due to his disability, n In
addition, surgery on the left shoulder was subsequently recommended. 12
In spite of all the evidence outlined herein, and in Appellant's initial brief,
documenting the serious injury to the left shoulder as a result of the industrial accident, it
is astounding that Dr. Clark and the medical panel can justifiably say that that there is "no

6A/.atl67.
7/</. at 81-131.
8 Id. at 602 and 609.
9 Id. at 17, 532 and 533.
10 M a t 461.
11 See Id. at 538 as an example.
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evidence indicating injuries to the shoulders . .. related to the [industrial] accident on
1/24/0 l."i3 This is a major reason why the opinions of the Dr. Clark and the medical
panel (who relied heavily on Dr. Clark), are not reasonably justified, and why Appellee
can not meet the substantial evidence test.
LOW BACK
Prior to the industrial accident on January 24, 2001, there is no documentation of
any significant lumbar problems. The only thing that the Appellee can counter with in
regard to the prior history of the lumber is its statement that on "November 3, 1998 Dr.
Warner diagnosed Mr. Brady with 'progressive disc space collapse at the L4-5 level.'"14
However, as a matter of record, the statement made by Dr. Warner is not true, and
Appellee knows it is not true. On October 18, 2004, Dr. Warner authored a letter wherein
he indicated that there was a typographical error in the prior note of November 3, 1998,
and that the reference he made to the disc space collapse at the "L4-5" level should
actually be the "C4-5" level. 15 Dr. Warner even attached to the October 18th letter a
corrected copy of the November 3, 1998 office note.i6

IZId atp. 508.
13 R. Vol. l o f 4, at p. 82.
14 See Brief of Appellee at p. 14, para. 17.
15 R. Vol. l o f 4, p. 74.
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The fact of the matter is that as a result of the industrial accident there were serious
injuries to the lumbar region. Immediately after the industrial accident, Appellant
complained of low back pain. \i On March 1, 2001, Dr. Sawchuck diagnosed Appellant
with acute lumbar sprain/strain, and lumbar radicular syndrome.is Dr. Sawchuck noted
that the low back injury from the industrial accident was totally new. 19 After a lumbar
MRI on March 10, 2001, Dr. Sawchuck assessed Appellant with "lumbar disc protrusion
and lumbar radicular syndrome."2o On April 17, 2001, Dr. Warner concluded that, "the
industrial accident precipitated symptoms of low back pain. The patient has a difficult
time straightening and bending due to the lower back pain"2i This serious symptom did
not exist at all prior to the industrial accident. It is significant to note that all of these
diagnoses and opinions were before the auto accident of December 2001. Furthermore,
on July 31, 2002 Dr. Sawchuck reviewed the bone scan results and diagnosed "some type
of fracture at L5 on the right side in the pedicle region."22 Even Dr. Clark, the IME
doctor hired by Appellee, conceded that "the industrial accident of 1/24/02 is documented
to have caused some . . . lumbar pain, which is possibly due to the occult fracture of the

16 Id. at p. 75. Even a cursory contextual reading of the original office note of November
3, 1998 will reveal that Dr. Warner was clearly discussing the cervical spine and not the
lumbar spine.
17R.Vol.3of4,p.609.
18 M a t p. 173.
19 M a t p. 169.
20 M a t p. 248.
21 M a t p. 462.
22 Id. at p. 223.
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L5 pedicle."23 Finally, the medical panel itself concluded that the fracture at L5 was due
to the industrial accident.24 Once again, it is astounding and irrational to think that Dr.
Clark and the medical panel could conclude that in spite of Appellant suffering a lumbar
fracture, a lumbar musculoskeletal strain that has developed in to a chronic condition, and
a protruding disc that is pausing radicular problems, in no way do these problems, which
were clearly caused by the industrial accident, have any thing to do with Appellant's
disability. This is further persuasive evidence that there is not substantial evidence to
support the Labor Commission's denial of benefits.
FRACTURE OF CERVICAL FUSION AND SIGNIFICANT AGGRAVATION OF
CERVICAL PAIN
Another factor supporting the conclusion that Dr. Clark's and the medical panel's
opinions are not rational is the evidence regarding injuries to the cervical region as a
result of the industrial accident. Appellee argues that "despite Mr. Brady's insistence that
the industrial accident broke his neck, the medical evidence is not supportive."25
Appellee then quotes Dr. Clark who opined that"... there is no evidence that any
fracture of his neck occurred ever, let alone on 1/24/01."26 However, on November 30,
1998, Dr. Warner performed exploratory surgery of the C5-7 fusion, and found that it was
intact and solid.27 Dr. Wamer noted in his letter of April 15, 2004, that "on January 24,
23 Id.
24 R. Vol. l o f 4 , p . 82.
25 See Appellee's brief at 29.
26 Id.
27 R. Vol. 3 of 4, at p. 28 and 323 A.
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2001, Mr. Brady was involved in an industrial accident... at that time, the patient
distinctly remembered feeling a snap in his neck. Following this the patient had a
significant increase in neck pain."28 Dr. Warner then went on to note that,
The patient had x-rays of the cervical spine done 3 months after his industrial accident.
The patient developed a large callus reaction anterior to the spine at C5-6 and
subsequently went on to completely fuse the C5-C6 level as seen on the film dated
October 7, 2003. The findings of these x-rays are consistent with a fracture of his fusion
with subsequent healing due to the stimulus of the trauma. I believe that the patient's
industrial accident caused a fracture of the patient's tenuous fusion at the C5-C6 and C6C7 levels. This was enough stimuli to lead to the fusion of the C5-C6 level The
patient still has a failure of the fusion at the C6-C7 level. As noted above, when I
explored the patient's fusion at the time of surgery on November 30, 1998, there was
solid bridging bone consistent with a fusion. It is my contention that the patient
sustained a fracture through these fusions in the industrial accident of January 24,
2001.29

In summary, based on the findings of the orthopedic surgeon who directly visualizedihe
fusion before the industrial accident, and then reviewed the x-rays and symptoms
immediately after the industrial accident, there was a fracture of the cervical spine related
to the industrial accident. As to how Dr. Clark and the medical panel, who Appellee is
relying upon extensively, can say there is absolutely no evidence of a fracture, is mind
boggling.
Perhaps what has led to the misguided and unsubstantiated opinions of Dr. Clark
and the medical panel is their mistaken reliance on the office note of Dr. Warner dated
October 13, 1998. In its brief, Appellee argues that "more importantly, the cervical fusion
surgery attempted in the 1990's was not successful. There was a non-union (separation)

28 Id. at 323A.
29/rf.atp.323A,323B.
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of the cervical vertebrae in the neck as far back as 1998."30 In support of this statement,
Appellee cites in footnote 104 the office note of Dr. Warner dated October 13, 1998. In
this office note Dr. Warner stated, "on the plain films, the patient appears to have a nonunion or pseudoarthrosis at the C5-C6 interspace."3i However, this was just Dr. Warner's
opinion based on his review of plain x-rays, and it is well understood that a doctor's preoperative diagnosis can be wrong. What Appellee has not pointed out, and what Dr.
Clark and the medical panel have failed to appreciate, is that the following month, on
November 30, 1998, Dr. Warner did exploratory surgery where he could actually
visualize the C5-7 fusion, and he could see that he was mistaken as to his prior opinion,
and that the fusion was indeed solid, as he subsequently said. As Dr. Warner said, "the
best way to evaluate a spinal fusion is direct inspection at the time of surgery."32 This
analysis casts even further doubt on the rationality of the opinions of Dr. Clark and the
medical panel.

DISCUSSION WITH MEDICAL PROVIDERS BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT AND AUTO ACCIDENT REGARDING APPELLANT QUITTING
WORK DUE TO DISABILITY
Prior to the industrial accident, there is no evidence in the record that Appellant
had any serious discussions with his medical providers regarding quitting work due to
physical disabilities. Conversely, soon after the industrial accident, when Appellant now

30 See Appellee's Brief at p. 29, 30.
31R.Vol.3of4,atp.32.
32 M a t p. 323 A.
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has a serious left shoulder injury, a fracture to his cervical ftision, and significant low
back injuries, Appellant then started having serious discussions about quitting work due
to his physical problems. In fact, in or about May of 2001, Appellant was advised by his
orthopedist to cease work altogether and seek disability.33 Also, as early as five days after
the industrial accident Dr. Sheridan noted that "he's (appellant), just terribly worried that
this (the industrial accident), represents a critical change in tris situation that will
necessitate his retirement.'^ It is absolutely significant that these retirement discussions
occurred before the subsequent auto accident in December qf 2001. As mentioned in
Appellant's initial brief, even though he was advised to quit work, Appellant decided to
continue working because it was.his therapy for dealing with the- violentdeath of his son,
and because he believed Appellee would fight the application for disability as they had
done with other employees.35
HYPOXIA
Appellee in its Brief does not refute the facts that after the industrial accident, and
before the subsequent auto accident, Appellants pain medications substantially increased.
The significance of this is that Drs. Elliot, who is chief of the pulmonary division at LDS
Hospital, and a professor of medicine at the University of Uteh Hospital, opined that the
hypoxia was a result of the increased use of pain medications.36 To further substantiate

33R.Vol.3of4,p.538.
34/</.atp.81.
35R.Vol.2of4,atp.58.
36 R. Vol. 3 of 4, at p. 344 and 390,
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this opinion, Dr. Thomas Cloward also opined that the most likely etiology of Appellant's
hypoxia was " . . . chronic hypoventilation due to his large narcotic doses."37 It is
important to remember that the pain medications were substantially, and gradually,
increased after the industrial accident due to the injuries cited above to the left shoulder,
the low back, and the fracture of the cervical fusion. Putting two and two together leads
to only one conclusion - the chronic hypoxia was caused by the industrial accident.
Appellee argues t h a t " . . . Mr. Brady suffered from breathing problems and was
diagnosed with hypoxia long before the industrial accident.'^ In support of this assertion,
Appellee cited in footnote 116 to a letter written by Dr. Sheridan on April 8, 2004.39
Indeed, in that letter Dr. Sheridan did1 say that "a statement was made that Mr. Brady was
first found to be hypoxemic on January 4,2000. In fact, Mr. Brady was hypoxemic at that
time... ."40 However, what follows in Dr. Sheridan's letter is of utmost importance, and
substantially qualifies and limits the prior statement. Dr. Sheridan went on to state, " . . .
but my estimation is that the source of his hypoxemia was bronchitic with a flare of
asthma, since he had a considerable period of time after that where he was not
complaining of difficulty breathing. He responded well to Biaxin and tuning of his
asthma medications." (emphasis added)4i Dr. Clark, the medical panel and Appellee
would have us believe that the hypoxia was a chronic condition before the industrial

37 Id. at p. 344.
38 See Appellee's Brief at p. 33.
39R.Vol.3of4,atp.488A.
40 Id.
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accident, and they have taken out of context a partial statement to support that invalid
assertion. However, as can plainly be seen by reading Dr. Sheridan's entire letter, he was
of the definite opinion that the hypoxia he diagnosed in January of 2000 was temporary
and caused by a flare up in Appellant's asthma, and that it went away with-appropriate
medication. Even more important is the fact, as noted by D t Sheridan, that there was a
considerable period after January 2000, that Appellant did not have any complaints of
difficulty breathing. This means that at the time of the industrial accident, Appellant did
not have chronic hypoxia.
In an attempt to counter the relation between heavy narcotic use and hypoxia,
Appellee cites a statement by Dr. Mark Passey (a pain management doctor at the
Intermountain Spine Institute), that "there is very little real evidence in the scientific
literature that chronic opioid use has any effect on ventilation . . . I doubt that the patient's
methadone has any contribution to his daytime hypoxemia.'^ It is interesting to note that
this statement is actually contradicted by the medical panel, Which Appellee relies heavily
upon in support of its position herein. In its report to the administrative law judge, the
medical panel stated that, "he (the Appellant) has been using opioid medication for some
time, which likely leads to reduced pulmonary drive . . . ."43
It is quite apparent that an important factor to the Appellee and to the medical
panel in concluding that the hypoxia is not related to the industrial accident is the
,

,

41 Id.
42 See Appellee's Brief at p. 33 and 34; and R. Vol. 3 of 4 at p. 213 and 382.
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,

allegation t h a t " . . . Mr. Brady didn't complain about shortness of breath to his healthcare
providers after the industrial accident until December 4, 2002, nearly 23 months later."44
The provider visit that Appellee is referring to is a visit with Dr. Sheridan. In his office
note regarding that visit, Dr. Sheridan stated:
Lex is complaining more of shortness of breath than anything. Chronic pain is
about the same . . . He also needs a refill on a Provential inhaler. The Advair is not
helping him very much. He is on 250/50. The presumption has always been of
asthma, but Lex just does not seem to be doing very well. He is polycythemic,
short of breath and ruddy-faced. I wonder if he has got some sort of chronic
hypoxemia going on.45
It goes without saying that just because December 4, 2002, is supposedly the first note of
shortness of breath complaints to a medical provider, that is not necessarily the first date
that Appellant actually experienced shortness of breath. The statements by Dr. Sheridan
that 'the presumption has always been of asthma," and "I wonder if he has got some sort
of chronic hypoxemia going on," (emphasis added), would suggest that the shortness of
breath symptom had been going on for quite some time. Indeed, it had. Appellant did not
have any significant chronic breathing problems before the industrial accident, but soon
thereafter, and before the subsequent auto accident, Appellant had problems breathing,
especially when he would carry items up stairs.46 Appellant just did not address this issue
with medical providers for a long time because he believed, based on what other people

43 R. Vol. 1 of 4, at p. 83 and 84.
44 See Appellee's Brief at p. 33; and R. Vol. 3 of 4, at p. 505.
45 R. Vol. 3 of 4, at p. 505.
46 R. Vol. 4 of 4, at p. 51 and 52.
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had told him, it was just a reaction to stress related to the tragic death of his son.47
Additional corroboration of the prior shortness of breath problem is the visit with Dr.
Sheridan on November 5, 2002, where Dr. Sheridan noted that "his oxygen saturation is
borderline today and I wonder if his asthma might be a little bit more important than we
think."48 Going further back, in April of 2002, Appellant complained to Dr. Sheridan at
that time about what the thought was his asthma acting up, and that he was having to use
his inhaler a lot more than usual.49
It is also important to consider that, as noted above, one of the plausible theories
for the hypoxia was due to heavy narcotic use. This is why Appellant in his initial brief
took pains to outline the significant increase in narcotic use ^fter the industrial accident.
The increase in narcotic use is something that occurred over a substantial period of time,
and with that substantial increase of use or a lengthy period of time there was a
corresponding gradual increase in respiration problems. Unfortunately, we have the
intervening auto accident in December of 2001, butnoverthdess, the^ggmeMS of the
breathing problems were first noticed by the Appellant after the industrial accident, but
before the auto accident.
^^km^hkBk®&herememb@i#d4hatthe .theory of the hypoxia resulting from the
increased narcotic use is only one of three plausible theories that were propounded by
Appellant's doctors. The other two theories were either a direct crush injury to the chest

47 Id
48 R. Vol. 3 of 4, at p. 506.
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as a result of the 2,000 pound sign landing on Appellant's chest, or damage to the nerves
in the cervical region as a result of the industrial accident which in turn caused paralysis
in the semi diaphragm. The significant point is that all three of these theories have their
causal roots in the industrial accident. So, it really doesn't matter which theory is correct,
because all three were caused by the industrial accident.
DR. CLARK
The credibility of Dr. Clark's opinions are significant, because it is quite apparent
that the medical panel relied to a great degree upon her opinions. In its Brief, Appellee
states that "Mr. Brady criticizes Dr. Clark's summary of the extensive medical records for
a very few irrelevant and harmless perceived misstatements of the medical Mstory."50 In
response to this statement, it is important first to note that Appellee does not refute any of
Appellant's allegations about the listed mistakes made by Dr. Clark. Appellee just simply
tries to characterize those mistakes as "irrelevant," and "harmless." Those mistakes made
by Dr. Clark are not irrelevant or harmless. For example, when Dr. Clark stated inher
report that her review of the x-rays from 3/31/97 showed that the cervical fusion was
solid, she was not only mistaken as to the history of when the cervical fusion was done (it
was done in November of 1998), she also brings in to question her ability to accurately
read x-rays. This is significant because her opinions are based to a great degree on her
review of the x-rays. Dr. Clark's inability to accurately read x-rays is further called in to

49 M a t p. 516.
50 See Appellee's Brief at p. 37.
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question when she reviewed one set of x-rays of the left shoulder and supposedly found
degenerative changes, and then she reviewed a subsequent set of x-rays of the left
shoulder and supposedly found no degenerative changes. As noted above, Appellant
claims that the problems associated with his left shoulder are a major factor in his
disability, so what is seen or not seen on x-rays of the left shoulder certainly is relevant,
and a misreading of those x-rays is not harmless, especially when Dr. Clark claims that
the left shoulder problems were not caused by the industrial accident. Furthermore, Dr.
Clark said that there was a lumbar myelogram performed on 121/19/96, but no such
myelogram can be found in the record, and Appellant does not remember any such
myelogram being done. Once again, this is relevant because Appellant claims that
problems with his low back are another major contributing factor to his disability.
It should also be remembered that in response to Dr. Clark's contention that the
cause of Appellant's pain and hypoxia was supposedly a cervical syrinx, Dr. Warner had
two neurosurgeons and two neuroradiologists, none of which were treating physicians,
review the MRIs from before and after the industrial accident, and all of them determined
that there was no syrinx, but if there was one it was very small and could not cause the
symptoms in question.51 It is amazing that the medical panel sided with Dr. Clark and her
syrinx theory, even in light of them knowing about all the other imminently more
qualified independent physicians who disagreed with Dr. Clark. Once again, it shows that
there was no justifiable basis for the opinion of the medical panel.

19

ISSUE NO. 2: DID DR. PEARL'S LETTER OF AUGUST 15, 2005, PRESENT
ANY NEW EVIDENCE
Appellee states in its Brief that "the refusal to submit Dr. Pearl's letter to the
medical panel after it issued it's report was reasonable and rational because the letter did
not present new conflicting evidence that was not already before the medical panel for
consideration.'^ In support of this assertion, Appellee refers to Dr. Pearl's letter of April
8, 2004, and alleges that in that prior letter " . . . Dr. Pearl himself discussed the possibility
that the nerves leading to the diaphragm from the cervical region may have been damaged
and referred Appellant to Dr. David Ryser to evaluate the function of those nerves."53
While it is true that in the prior letter Dr. Pearl did discuss the possibility that the phrenic
nerve may have been damaged, there are at least two new items that Dr. Pearl discussed in
his August 15,2005 letter that should have been presented to the medical panel for
review. First, Dr. Pearl noted that the EMG that Dr. Jarvis was basing his opinion on was
"equivocal."54 This means, as Dr. Pearl noted, that the result of the test could not show
one way or another whether the phrenic nerve was intact. And second, in the prior letter
Dr. Pearl had noted that he thought the hypoxia was a result of paralysis to the
hemidiaphragm, and he questioned whether the phrenic nerve leading to the
hemidiaphragm had been damaged, whereas, in the second letter Dr. Pearl raised the

51R.Vol.3of4,atp.323B.
52Matp.38,39.
53 M a t p. 39.
54 R. Vol. l o f 4 , a t p . 87.
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question as to whether there was a relationship between the neck injuries alleged as a
result of the industrial accident, and the paralysis to the hermidiaphragm. Stated another
way, in the prior letter Dr. Pearl was wondering if there was some damage to the phrenic
nerve, at any point along it's course from the cervical region to the diaphragm, whereas,
in the second letter Dr. Pearl was questioning whether therel was some damage to the
nerves as a result of a specific alleged cervical injury from the industrial accident. It was
Dr. Pearl's opinion that based on the fact that there was no dhange in the cervical
radiographs between the industrial accident and the subsequent auto accident, it must
have been the cervical injuries from the industrial accident Which caused the paralysis in
the hemidiaphragm since the paralysis of the hemidiaphragmi was demonstrated prior to
the auto accident.55 This new evidence should have been presented to the medical panel
for their review.
REWEIGHING OF MEDICAL EXPERTS' TESTIMONIES AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
Appellee states in its Brief t h a t " . . . the Court of Appeals will not reweigh the
medical experts' testimonies.'^ In support of this assertion the Appellee cites in footnote
92 to the case of Wherritt v. Industrial Comm % 100 Utah 68, 110 P.2d 374, 376 (1941).
It should first be noted that Appellee did not insert any quotation marks on the sentence
quoted from Appellee's Brief, and there is good reason for such because no where in the
Wherritt case does it say what Appellee claims it said. The Wherritt case dealt with the
55 Id
21

question of whether an employee was within the course and scope of his employment
when he as on his way to work. It did not deal with expert medical testimonies at all.
In implementing the substantial evidence standard, this court necessarily has to
reweigh some, if not all, of the medical experts' testimonies or else how can it come to a
conclusion as to whether there is " . . . substantial evidence, which exists when the factual
findings support more than a scintilla of evidence, though something less than the weight
of the evidence."57 In order to determine if the findings support more than a scintilla of
evidence, though something less than the weight of the evidence, this Court necessarily
has to look at and weigh the evidence, and some of the evidence are the testimonies of the
medical experts.

56 See Appellee's Brief at p. 27.
57 Martinez v. Media-Playmaster et al, 164 P.3d 384, 394 (UT 2007).
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CONCLUSION
Appellee can not meet the Substantial evidence test because the opinions of Dr.
Clark and the medical panel can not be justifiably supported by the undisputed evidence
in this matter. Thus, the decision of the Labor Commission upholding the denial of
benefits should be over turned.
Respectfully submitted this

/

day of December 2009.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of
Petitioner was mailed December I , 2009 first class postage prepaid to the following:
James R. Black, Esq.
265 East 100 South, Suite 255
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Alan L. Hennebold
Assistant Attorney General
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